






What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of wrongful 
discrimination? What explains why it is wrongful? And what 
factors aggravate its wrongness? Answering these three questions 
is central to a complete theory of discrimination, which is vital for 
many pertinent problems in legal and political philosophy. For 
example, there is a risk that anti-discrimination legislation will be 
misconceived or inadequate without the guidance of a principled 
understanding of its wrongfulness. This is highlighted by the 
criticism often made of such legislation that it fails to redress 
trends in which structures, rules, or policies are formally equally 
applicable, but in practice lead to differential outcomes between 
specified groups. To judge the force of this complaint, and to 
accommodate multiple practices that are often placed under the 
rubric of discrimination, we need a systematic answer to these 
questions.         
 Theoretical debates about discrimination are also significant 
for they require us to engage with wider themes concerning the 
nature of moral wrongdoing and, in particular, the factors that 
make a given action wrongful. One such debate is the 
disagreement about whether intentions are wrong-making 
properties. In the present context, it is important to determine 
whether an act of discrimination can be wrong purely in virtue of 
the discriminator’s intentions or, more broadly, some feature of her 
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deliberations. If an employer has legitimate grounds on which to 
reject an unqualified candidate, does she act wrongly if she rejects 
the applicant for more dubious reasons? We believe that she does, 
and hope that our arguments to this effect will provide further 
support for the deeper claim that intentions are generally relevant 
to moral permissibility.   
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a complete 
theory of discrimination. Instead, we will discuss one of the most 
contested issues within the debate, which relates to the distinction 
between accounts of discrimination that are exclusively 
consequence-focussed and those that are not. The latter hold that 
discrimination can be rendered wrong by factors other than the 
states of affairs that the act brings about. One version is defended 
by Larry Alexander, who concentrates on the mental states of the 
agent, arguing that her act is wrong when the intention with which 
it is performed involves a denial of the victim’s equal moral 
status.2 Conversely, both Deborah Hellman and Thomas Scanlon 
locate the wrongness of discrimination, not in the mental states of 
the perpetrator, but in the objective meaning expressed by 
discriminatory acts. Hellman finds an explanation in demeaning 
acts, understood as those that convey to another that she is 
unworthy of equal concern. 3  Scanlon argues that acts of 
discrimination are objectionable when victims can reasonably 
attribute offensive meaning to them.4              
By contrast, exclusively consequence-focussed views rule 
out the possibility that any of the intrinsic features of the act or the 
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mental states of the agent possess wrong-making status 
independently of the states of affairs that they bring about. 
Intrinsic features and mental states can possess wrong-making 
status only derivatively, in virtue of the role they play in realising 
the outcomes that make the act wrong. Exclusively consequence-
focussed views about discrimination are not necessarily 
consequentialist, in that they need not imply a general duty to 
realise the best consequences (they might admit that consequences 
are not all that matter in determining permissibility in other 
contexts).5 But despite this caveat, they are naturally allied to a 
consequentialist moral framework.  
Although one could conceive of a variety of exclusively 
consequence-focussed views, we focus on one in particular – the 
Harm-Based Account – since it is the only version that has been 
defended at length.6 Roughly, this account claims that what makes 
discrimination wrongful is its harmful effects. We argue that the 
Harm-Based Account mischaracterises the wrongness of 
discrimination. This fact is brought into sharp relief by considering 
cases of wrongful but harmless discrimination. We analyse some of 
these cases to advance two objections. The first is the conditions 
objection, which states that the Harm-Based Account implausibly 
fails to recognise that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The 
second is the explanation objection, which states that the Harm-
Based Account fails adequately to explain why discrimination is 
wrong when it is. In the final section of the paper, we gesture 
towards the structure of a more promising account, which is better 
able to deal with the objections developed in this paper.  
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking not all consequentialists make this claim about maximizing 
impersonal value. See, for example, Michael Slote, ‘Satisficing 
Consequentialism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 58 (1984), 139-63. 
6 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the 
Nature of Discrimination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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The Harm-Based Account 
 
The most sophisticated version of the Harm-Based Account is 
offered by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. It holds that 
 
an instance of discrimination is wrong, when it is, 
because it makes people worse off, i.e., they are worse 
off given the presence of discrimination than they 
would have been in some suitable alternative situation 
in which the relevant instance of discrimination had not 
taken place.7 
 
There are three dimensions of this definition that warrant 
elaboration.8 First, we should distinguish between two types of 
harm: the harm inflicted on the recipient of the discrimination and 
the harm inflicted on others. If a person harmlessly discriminates 
against another (we defend this possibility later) but harms a third 
party, it is open to the Harm-Based Account to hold that the act is 
wrongful because of the harm to the third party. Would this imply 
that the person who is wronged is the third party rather than the 
recipient of discrimination, and also that the third party is a victim 
of wrongful discrimination, regardless of how the collateral harm 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 154-5. 
8 It is also important to mention that Lippert-Rasmussen situates his Harm-
Based Account within a desert-prioritarian theory of moral value. These 
elements are separable from one another. The objections that we develop rely on 
cases of harmless discrimination that do not affect the distribution of harms and 
benefits that engage this theory of moral value. Our objections are directed at 
the Harm-Based Account in general and not only at Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
favoured desert-prioritarian account. We concede that a desert-prioriatrian 
account of moral value is superior to other consequentialst views, such as those 
that do not give priority to the worse off, but our objections ultimately target the 
exclusively consequence-focussed feature of the Harm-Based Account, which is 
shared by all versions. Ibid., 165-70.        
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results? If so, we doubt the plausibility of these implications, but 
we leave this issue open since our objections do not require 
resolving it. 
Second, the Harm-Based Account is most plausibly 
understood as providing an account of the prima facie or 
presumptive wrongness of discrimination.9 If a discriminatory act 
is harmful, this generates a presumption in favour of that act’s 
being wrong. In some cases, a presumptively wrong act turns out 
on reflection not to be wrong in any way. This can be seen in some 
cases of affirmative action, where, since certain well off individuals 
have already benefitted from unfair background conditions, it is in 
no way wrong to discriminate harmfully against them in order to 
remove this unfair advantage. In other cases, a presumptively 
wrong act of discrimination is pro tanto wrong, but not wrong all-
things-considered. In these cases, the pro tanto wrongness is 
outweighed by countervailing considerations. One example would 
be discriminating against a member of an unfairly advantaged 
group who has not been individually benefitted. If a male 
candidate, who has not personally benefitted from the advantages 
enjoyed by males, is disadvantaged in the implementation of an 
affirmative action policy, he is treated pro tanto unfairly. But this 
unfairness may be overridden by the instrumental benefits of the 
policy if it achieves a fairer distribution of opportunities between 
men and women overall. 
Third, in order for the full range of implications of the 
Harm-Based Account to be understood, it must make reference to 
a complete theory of harm. Such a theory must answer at least two 
questions: what is the currency of harm and how is harm to be 
measured? The currency is the good or goods setback to which 
constitutes harm. Specifying the currency helps to characterise 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 29. 
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harm, as it is the value of the currency that explains why its 
frustration is bad. For example, if preferences are the currency of 
harm, the value of preference-satisfaction explains why harm is 
bad, for harm consists in frustrating a person’s preferences. The 
measure of harm is the scale on which degrees of harm are 
marked.10 For instance, should harm be measured counterfactually, 
by reference to an alternative state that the victim might now have 
been in had some other sequence of events occurred? And if so, 
how do we pick out the relevant counterfactuals, and what is the 
appropriate baseline with which to compare them? 11  We will 
return to some of these questions later.       
We began this paper with three questions that are central to 
an account of the wrongness of discrimination: What are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of wrongful discrimination? 
What explains why discrimination is wrongful? And what factors 
aggravate the wrongness of discrimination? We can call these the 
‘conditions question’, the ‘explanation question’ and the ‘degree 
question’, respectively. The most attractive version of the Harm-
Based Account answers these questions as follows. First, harm is a 
necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition of wrongness. 
Second, harm is the wrong-making property. That is, 
discrimination is wrong, when it is, because it is harmful, not 
simply because harm always accompanies the actual wrong-
making property. Finally, the degree of harm done is an 
aggravating factor. The addition of other aggravating factors, such 
as the pre-existing level of wellbeing of the victim or membership 
of a historically disadvantaged group, is also possible. This means 
that the Harm-Based Account can be non-consequence focussed 
                                                 
10  See Victor Tadros, ‘What Might Have Been’ in John Oberdiek (Ed.), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 171-92, 172.  
11 Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal, 64. 
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with respect to the ‘degree question’. Again, since our objections 
do not require rejecting these possibilities, we will leave them 
open.   
 
The Conditions Objection 
 
The Harm-Based Account has implausible implications in cases of 
harmless discrimination. We will proceed by analysing a variety of 
cases in which a discriminatory act seems wrongful even though it 
causes the victim no harm. 
Consider the following case, which is presented by Lippert-
Rasmussen: 
 
Nazi University: The head of a German university in the 
1930s in Nazi Germany, in making decisions about 
promotions, discriminates against a Jewish employee, 
forcing him to emigrate to the United States, where he 
ends up much better off than he would have been had 
he stayed at the university.12 
 
The Harm-Based Account seems to imply that, since the victim is 
not made worse off, the head does not act wrongly. This is a 
counterintuitive result. 
Defenders of the Harm-Based Account might offer a 
number of responses. The first, which we can call the ‘coincidence 
response’, appeals to the fact that it is ‘entirely coincidental that the 
Jewish university lecturer ended up better off and the head of the 
university presumably had good reason to think that the result 
would have been different.’13 What matters to wrongness is not the 
consequences that in fact result, but the consequences that the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 157.  
13 Ibid., 158.  
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agent believed would result, or had good reason to believe would 
result. This response commits the defender of the Harm-Based 
Account to a belief- or evidence-relative conception of wrongness, 
but it protects the conclusion that, in cases where a person acts 
maliciously but unforeseeably benefits the victim, she still acts 
wrongly.14  
The second response, which we can call the ‘systematic 
response’, distinguishes between individual harms and systematic 
harms, to which individual harms contribute. Even if the harm 
involved in any individual act of discrimination is close to zero, it 
may contribute to a systematic harm. As Richard Arneson points 
out, it may be that ‘One acts wrongly because one fails to act 
against this massive wrongful discrimination, and in so doing one 
contributes to the maintenance of a vicious…hierarchy.’15 It may 
do this in two ways. First, each act of discrimination adds to a 
large-scale social practice, and so discriminators collectively inflict 
great harm on disadvantaged groups. Second, each act may 
increase the likelihood that others will contribute in a similar way. 
Both of these are plausibly true in Nazi University. Although the 
employee is not harmed, the employer’s actions contribute to a 
systematic practice that causes widespread harm to the Jewish 
population. In addition, by contributing to this culture of anti-
Semitism, each act increases the likelihood that further 
discriminatory acts will occur.  
The third can be called the ‘baseline response’, which offers 
a more nuanced method of measuring harm. Lippert-Rasmussen 
opts for a counterfactual analysis of the relevant baseline for 
                                                 
14  For the threefold distinction between fact, evidence and belief-relative 
wrongness, see Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), ch. 7.   
15 Richard Arneson, ‘What Is Wrongful Discrimination?’, San Diego Law Review, 
43 (2006), 775-807, 790. 
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calculating harm. On what he calls the Straightforward Account, a 
person is harmed by some event, E, if she is worse off now than 
she would be had E not occurred. There are problems with this 
view. It falsely implies that if a person is subjected to a 
discriminatory act that unexpectedly makes her no worse off than 
she would have been had the act not occurred, she is not harmed 
and therefore the act is not wrong (as demonstrated in Nazi 
University). Partly in response to this problem, Lippert-Rasmussen 
canvasses two other options: the No-Discrimination Baseline Account 
and the Ideal Baseline. The former holds that we should compare the 
actual outcome of the discriminatory act to the one that would 
have obtained if it had not been performed and no one else had 
performed discriminatory acts in the future. The latter sets the 
baseline as that in which everyone else acted morally permissibly 
from the time of the discriminatory act and henceforth. 16   
None of these responses salvages the Harm-Based Account. 
To see this, consider the following modification of Nazi University: 
 
Cambridge University: Helen is an admissions officer at 
Cambridge University. As a result of her racist 
prejudices, she is averse to spending time around 
students with dark skin tone. Having read Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s Born Free and Equal, she believes 
that it would be wrong for her to harm these applicants, 
so she uses her connections to ensure that all those 
applicants that she rejects on racist grounds secure a 
place at Oxford. (The places Helen secures for these 
students are additional ones such that no one else is 
denied a place at Oxford as a result of Helen’s actions.) 
Applicants are indifferent between Oxford and 
                                                 
16 Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal, 158 n. 9.  
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Cambridge, and they would not have received an offer 
from Oxford but for Helen’s intervention.    
 
Cambridge University evades the ‘coincidence response’, the 
‘systematic response’, and the ‘baseline response’. First, the 
harmlessness of the discriminatory act is not coincidental. This is 
explicit in the stipulation that Helen discriminates only on the 
condition that she can use her connections to ensure that 
applicants are not harmed. If Helen had any grounds to believe 
that she could not secure a rejected applicant a place at Oxford, she 
would not discriminate.      
Second, the ‘systematic response’ seems at first sight to have 
force against Cambridge University. Helen’s actions may contribute 
to a racist culture and a harmful systematic practice, even if her 
individual actions are harmless. However, Cambridge University 
can easily be modified to meet this response. Suppose that Helen 
effectively disguises her activity, such that she makes no 
contribution to a culture of racism. She does not increase the risk 
that she or others will discriminate in the future, or promulgate 
damaging racist attitudes. We can even imagine that, through her 
deceptive efforts, Helen is generally seen as a promoter of racial 
equality, and the ethnic homogeneity at Cambridge is attributed to 
other causes. Moreover, she does not contribute to a systematic 
practice that is harmful overall. Rather, she practices strictly 
harmless and non-public discrimination. This practice, whether at 
the systematic or individual level, is harmless. 
Third, reference to neither the No-Discrimination Baseline nor 
the Ideal Baseline will yield the result that applicants are harmed. 
This is because there are no further impermissible acts, whether 
discriminatory or non-discriminatory, that affect the applicants, 
which the act of discrimination pre-empts. This distinguishes 
Cambridge University from Nazi University, for in the latter further 
11 
 
wrongs would probably be committed against the Jewish 
employee had he not been forced to move to the United States.  
However, there is a fourth response that requires more 
comprehensive treatment. This response threatens the category of 
harmless wrongful discrimination directly. We can call this the 
‘local harm response’. It draws our attention to the fact that even if 
victims of wrongful discrimination end up no worse off overall, 
they typically suffer local harms. The local harm may be sufficient 
to render the discrimination wrongful. According to this response, 
the victims of discrimination in Cambridge University are wronged 
because they are harmed in one way.   
One type of local harm in Nazi University is the violation of 
the employee’s preference not to be fired. As Lippert-Rasmussen 
notes, the Jewish employee ‘had a preference for being promoted 
and by discriminating against him the head of the university 
frustrated this preference’. 17  This version of the local harm 
response is easily dealt with. In Cambridge University, it is 
stipulated that the applicants are indifferent between Oxford and 
Cambridge, and hence, on the preference view, are not harmed as 
a result of the wrongful discrimination. (We may also imagine, 
perhaps less plausibly, that the applicants’ desire for a prestigious 
higher education is so acute that they are also indifferent about 
whether they realise this goal as a result of discrimination.) 
However, this is not a complete response to the local harm 
objection because the preference-based view is only one available 
view about the currency of harm. It may be that the applicant is 
harmed by being denied a place at Cambridge regardless of her 
preferences. 
We can flesh out this idea in a number of ways. Perhaps the 
harm consists in an affront to the applicant’s dignity or a denial of 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 157.  
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her equal moral worth. Though setback to these goods will often 
cause distress, humiliation, or upset, this will not always be the 
case, and these sensations and experiences are not necessary for 
the judgement that the victim is harmed. If this is true, and on the 
further assumption that attending Oxford is no worse for her than 
attending Cambridge, Cambridge University involves a compensated 
harm. Though the case involves compensation, there is an initial 
local harm present.  
 To deal with the local harm response more 
comprehensively, we can construct further cases that eliminate all 
local harms. Consider the following: 
 
Cambridge University 2: Identical to Cambridge University, 
except that Helen does not reject the applications to 
Cambridge, but gives them the option of going to 
Oxford.  
 
Capricious Teacher: A disaffected teacher issues 
unjustified detentions to students in her class. She 
decides not to issue detentions to members of ethnic 
minorities because she prefers to avoid their company.  
       
Racist Voter: A firm appoints new staff by taking a vote 
amongst existing members. One voter wants to reject a 
particular applicant because of her skin colour. He 
knows that his vote will not affect the result because his 
co-workers have already agreed to appoint her. 
Nevertheless, he votes for rejecting the candidate.  
  
All three cases involve harmless discrimination. In each case, the 
discriminatory activity can be divided into two elements: an agent 
or group of agents deliberates inappropriately and this 
deliberation then issues in a discriminatory action. Furthermore, 
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unlike Cambridge University, neither Capricious Teacher nor Racist 
Voter involves the denial of an opportunity to the victim. They are 
therefore not cases of compensated harm, but genuine instances of 
harmless action. One worry about Racist Voter is that, even if the 
voter does not in fact cause harm, he increases the risk of harm by 
casting his vote against the applicant. This distinct factor might 
make a moral difference. But this possibility is screened out of 
Racist Voter by the stipulation that the voter knows that his vote 
will not affect the result. This shows that the Harm-Based Account 
answers the ‘conditions question’ incorrectly: a harmful outcome is 
not a necessary condition of the wrongness of discrimination.   
At this point, a defender of the Harm-Based Account might 
return to the idea of affronting dignity or violating equal moral 
worth to salvage the judgment that these cases involve harm. It is 
arguable that the best theory of harm is objective and non-
experiential. A theory of harm is objective in this sense if it allows 
that a person can be harmed by some event, E, irrespective of that 
person’s relevant mental states. So E might harm a person despite 
the fact that E does not frustrate her desires; E may even harm her 
if she positively desires E. A theory is non-experiential if it rejects 
the claim that, in order for E to harm a person, E must have some 
impact on her experiences.  
Some harms seem to be objective and non-experiential. For 
example, it is intuitive that an event that frustrates the 
achievement of a valuable project is harmful independently of the 
agent’s desires and experiences. Here is an example that 
demonstrates the plausibility of these claims about harm.  
 
Disenchanted Philosopher: Diane spends a decade of her 
life working on a project in moral philosophy. After 
reading Nietzsche she becomes a nihilist, decides that 
the book is a waste of time, and becomes indifferent 
about publishing it. A colleague finds the work, 
recognises its brilliance, and makes plans to publish it. 
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Another colleague, who has also been reading 
Nietzsche, destroys the work before it can be published. 
Diane never discovers what happens to her manuscript. 
 
Philosophers will be divided over whether the destruction of the 
manuscript harms Diane. For the sake of argument, we assume 
that destroying the manuscript before Diane’s colleague can 
publish it frustrates a very significant achievement. Given this 
assumption, it is at least arguable that Diane is harmed by the 
destruction of the manuscript even though she is unaware of it and 
would be indifferent to it if she found out. 
 If this is true, might affronts to dignity or violations of equal 
moral worth also be objective, non-experiential harms? In 
Capricious Teacher, for example, might the teacher’s racist 
disinclination to spend time in the company of certain students 
harm them even if the students are indifferent and unaware?  
 This response is problematic for two reasons. First, it 
salvages the plausibility of the Harm-Based Account at the expense 
of rendering it indistinctive, in the sense that it treats too wide a 
range of intuitively distinct wrong-making properties as harmful. 
Although broadening a view to accommodate criticism is often 
appropriate, this version of the Harm-Based Account seems so 
broad that it is difficult to conceive of any serious alternative 
answer to the ‘conditions question’. It would threaten the 
fundamental distinction between exclusively consequence-
focussed views and non-exclusively consequence-focussed views 
by raising the possibility that all objectionable mental states and/or 
objective meanings necessarily produce (harmful) consequences. It 
is doubtful that any defender of the Harm-Based Account would 
wish to broaden the relevant conception of harm to this degree – 
this addresses opposing views simply by colonising them.  
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 Moreover, even if there are objective, non-experiential 
harms, we still need an argument that the actions in Cambridge 
University 2, Capricious Teacher and Racist Voter constitute such 
harms. For it seems that the actions in the three cases we outline 
above affront the victim’s dignity or violate her equal moral worth, 
even though it is intuitive that no harm is done. There seems to be 
an important difference between plausible candidates for objective, 
non-experiential harms, such as frustrating a valuable project, and 
these cases. Imagine, for example, that a racist millionaire decides 
to give some money away. He randomly picks names from the 
phonebook, deliberately discarding any name to which he takes a 
disliking. The millionaire practices discrimination, but, unless we 
adopt an implausible view on the relevant baseline, he does not 
harm those people whose names he rejects on racist grounds.       
 We can intensify the force of the conditions objection by 
pointing to cases of beneficial wrongful discrimination.18 These are 
cases of wrongful discrimination in which the victim is benefited 
by an act of discrimination that involves no local harm.  
Consider the following: 
 
Cambridge University 3: Identical to Cambridge University 
2, except that applicants prefer Oxford to Cambridge. 
 
In Cambridge University 3, Helen expands the applicants’ 
opportunities by ensuring that they are offered places at Oxford, 
thus benefitting them. Moreover, since she does not reject their 
applications to Cambridge, this case involves no local harm either. 
Despite benefiting the applicants, Helen’s actions remain 
wrongful. Although there may be differing explanations for this 
                                                 
18 Nazi University is a case of beneficial discrimination that involves a local harm. 




wrongfulness, the most promising is that Helen’s actions are 
wrong because they are motivated by the desire not to spend time 
around dark-skinned students.19 Helen’s act is most clearly wrong 
when the benefit that she confers on an applicant is only very 
slight. It is less clear what we should make of cases in which the 
benefit conferred is much larger. Sufficiently large benefits may be 
capable of defeating the wrongness of the discrimination. One 
example might be an admissions officer at a much lower ranking 
university who uses her connections to secure places at Oxford for 
applicants to her university. This is a possibility that we are happy 
to leave open.  
 Before we proceed to our second general objection to the 
Harm-Based Account, there are two important responses that we 
should briefly consider. The first is to bite the bullet and claim that 
in all of the counterexamples we have offered, the agents in 
question act permissibly. This response might be bolstered by the 
observation that, though there is no impermissible action, the 
agents exhibit bad character. There is something morally defective 
about the agents, manifested in their intentions, their character or 
their deliberative processes, but none of these defects renders their 
actions impermissible. One could add that even if these examples 
retain some force, any account of the wrongness of discrimination 
will have some revisionist implications about controversial cases, 
and so a few intuitive counterexamples cannot count decisively 
against any particular view.       
 This response can be made in two ways. Either intentions 
are not relevant to permissibility in cases of discrimination, though 
                                                 
19 We should not be surprised by the conclusion that an act can be wrongful 
even though if benefits the victim. Jonathan Quong, for example, reaches a 
structurally identical conclusion in his analysis of the wrongness of paternalism. 
See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), ch. 3.  
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they may be relevant generally, or they are never relevant to 
permissibility, so a fortiori they are not relevant in cases of 
discrimination.20 The first version is dubious since it would be odd 
if the manner in which intentions affect permissible action is so 
circumscribed. The onus is on the respondent to explain the 
material difference between discrimination and other categories of 
cases. Even if such differences exist, they seem to pull in the 
opposite direction, suggesting that intentions are particularly 
relevant to permissibility in these cases. Even Scanlon, who argues 
that intentions are not generally relevant to permissibility, states 
that ‘There may be cases in which it would be permissible for an 
agent to fail to give a person a certain benefit, but not permissible 
to do so because, for example, he or she belongs to a racial group 
the agent regards as inferior or not worthy of the kind of 
consideration that others are owed.’21  
 The second version of the response is not ad hoc and rests on 
a deeper debate about the sources of wrongdoing. More 
specifically, it relies on the general thesis that intentions never non-
derivatively determine the permissibility of actions.22 The problem 
with this response is that the general thesis on which it depends 
leads to a wide range of other highly counterintuitive results. Here 
are two. First, consider a duress case. A is threatened that unless 
she robs a post office her family will be killed. The fact that she has 
access to a reason that would justify robbing the post office does 
                                                 
20 For a defence of the view that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility, see 
Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, ch. 1; J. J. Thomson, ‘Self-Defense’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 20 (1991), 283-310; J. J. Thomson ‘Physician Assisted Suicide: Two 
Moral Arguments’, Ethics, 109 (1999), 497-518; and F. M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: 
Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), ch. 5. 
21 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, 69-70.   
22 It is consistent with this view that intentions may derivatively determine the 
permissibility of action by virtue of their predictive significance. See Scanlon, 
Moral Dimensions, 62-6.      
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not make this act permissible if she commits the robbery simply 
because she enjoys the thrill of crime. Secondly, consider an 
overdetermination case. A and B both wish to poison C. Two doses 
together will kill C quickly whilst one dose will give C a painful 
death. A doses C. B then doses C, and in doing so benefits him by 
preventing a painful death. However, if B’s intention is to kill C, he 
does not act permissibly (we can add that, conversely, C acts 
permissibly if he doses C in order to avert a painful death).23 In the 
light of these implications, insisting that the agents act permissibly 
in our counterexamples is not a single bullet to bite, but rather one 
of a volley of bullets. We highlight these implications to emphasise 
that, in the present discussion, insisting that any view will have at 
least some revisionist implications is not as reasonable as it first 
appears.    
 The second response is to concede that our counterexamples 
involve wrongful action, but to deny that they involve wrongful 
discrimination. Hellman discusses the example of denying 
someone a job or a place at school because her name begins with 
the letter A. She claims that, though wrongful and discrimination, 
it is not wrongful discrimination. Instead, the wrong consists in the 
official acting outside of her delegated authority or failing to do 
what she has promised to do.24 Similarly, in Cambridge University, 
perhaps what is wrong with Helen’s actions is that she misuses her 
authority or breaches a promise to her employer, not that she 
wrongfully discriminates.   
This response is vulnerable to three objections. First, the two 
cases are disanalogous on Hellman’s own terms because, in her 
example, ‘the source of the wrongfulness does not have anything 
to do with failing to treat each person as a person of equal moral 
                                                 
23 Victor Tadros offers both of these examples in The Ends of Harm: The Moral 
Foundations of Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 158-9.  
24 Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong?, 16-17.  
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worth.’25 This is not true of Cambridge University and its variations 
because Helen acts on the basis of explicit racial prejudice. In a 
variation of Hellman’s case in which candidates with names 
beginning with the letter A are rejected because of a belief that they 
have lesser moral worth, the act would be wrong for the same 
reasons (although the presence of widespread historic and 
systemic injustice is no doubt an aggravating factor in the racial 
case). In the original case, we assume the motivation to reject the 
candidate is, though capricious, not based on a belief in lesser 
moral worth.        
 Second, it implies that wrongful harmless discrimination 
cannot be practised where professional responsibilities do not 
arise. This is hard to believe. We have already offered the example 
of the racist millionaire who discriminates against certain groups 
when giving his money away. The millionaire practises wrongful 
discrimination even though he lacks professional obligations to an 
employer. Given the structural similarity between this case and 
Cambridge University, it is reasonable to conclude, by parity of 
reasoning, that the latter also involves wrongful discrimination. 
Perhaps there is an alternative to professional duties, which is 
more plausible than the motivational story we have told, but if so 
the onus is on the respondent to identify it.      
Thirdly, even if all of this is rejected, these wrongs are not 
mutually exclusive. Helen may violate her professional 
responsibilities and practice wrongful discrimination. In fact, she 
plausibly does this by practising wrongful discrimination. To see 
this, note that the response misidentifies the victims of Helen’s 
actions. Though she may wrong her employer by breaching a 
promise or contractual term, she also wrongs the applicant, and 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 17. 
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this cannot be explained by reference to Helen’s professional 
responsibilities alone.              
   
The Explanation Objection 
 
The arguments of the previous section refute the claim that a 
harmful outcome is a necessary condition of wrongful 
discrimination. But, they also entail that the Harm-Based 
Account’s answer to the ‘explanation question’ is false: when 
discriminatory acts are wrong, what makes them wrong is not 
always their harmfulness. Or, in other words, if harm is not a 
necessary condition of the wrongness of discrimination, it cannot 
explain why discrimination is wrong in every instance. This is the 
explanation objection.  
In response to the explanation objection, a defender of the 
Harm-Based Account might take one of two options. The first is to 
maintain that harm is necessary for wrongful discrimination, but 
acknowledge that it may not always explain that wrongfulness. In 
so far as this concedes that factors other than harm can explain 
why discrimination is wrong, this move is attractive. However, if 
the implication is that, in some cases of harmful discrimination, the 
harm plays no role in explaining its wrongness, then this move is 
ill-motivated. It is hard to accept that the presence of harm does 
not play any role in explaining why the act is wrong. This is not 
how we think about the close connection between harming and 
wronging generally: if harm is a necessary condition of an act’s 
being wrongful, we would expect it to play some role in the 
explanation of its wrongness whenever it is present.26     
                                                 
26 This is not to say that all necessary conditions of a wrongful act play a role in 
explaining its wrongness. For example, a necessary condition of an act being 
wrong is that it is located in time and space, but being located in time and space 




The second option is to relinquish the claim that harm is a 
necessary condition of wrongness and hold instead that when 
discrimination is harmful, its harmfulness alone makes it 
wrongful, but there are some cases of harmless wrongful 
discrimination in which there is some other explanation of the act’s 
wrongfulness. This move embraces a pluralism about the 
‘conditions question’ and ‘explanation question’ – it accepts that 
some instances of wrongful discrimination are harmless and, a 
fortiori, are not wrong because they are harmful – but maintains 
that, when harmful discrimination is wrong, it is wrong only 
because it is harmful.27 
 The revised Harm-Based Account is capable of generating 
the conclusion that harmless discrimination can be wrong, but it 
still fails plausibly to answer the ‘explanation question’, and in this 
respect inherits a flaw from its predecessor. The general objection 
is that harm alone cannot explain why discrimination is wrongful 
when it is.  
In support of this claim, consider the following variation of 
Cambridge University. This variation is identical to Cambridge 
University, except that the applicants do not receive an offer from 
Oxford, and so Helen’s discriminatory acts are harmful because 
they deny applicants the opportunity for a good education. With 
respect to the ‘conditions question’, the revised Harm-Based 
Account correctly implies that this is a case of wrongful 
discrimination. However, with respect to the ‘explanation 
question’, it still seems that the wrongness is not explained solely 
by the harmful outcome of Helen’s actions. 
                                                                                                                        
controversial that the presence of harm sometimes helps to explain why an act is 
wrong. We thank Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen for pressing this point.    




There are two points in support of this judgement. First, 
when we attend to the nature of Helen’s wrongdoing, we see that 
it is non-contingent. The wrongness of the act is not contingent on 
its consequences. To see this, we can observe that Helen’s act is 
wrong for the same reasons in the original version of Cambridge 
University. We do not deny that Helen’s act in the second variation 
is more wrongful, since we accept that the degree of harmfulness is 
an aggravating factor (the ‘degree question’). The point is rather 
that harm alone does not explain what makes the act wrong: other 
wrong-making features are also present. Second, as an epistemic 
matter, we can ascertain that Helen’s act is wrong without any 
calculation of its consequences. We conjecture that many people, if 
given a description of Helen’s action and the further stipulation 
that her action may be either harmful or harmless, would arrive at 
the conclusion that Helen acts wrongly.28 These two points, that 
Helen’s act is non-contingently wrong, and that we have epistemic 
access to its wrongness without information about its 
consequences, demonstrate that even the revised Harm-Based 
Account systematically fails plausibly to answer the ‘explanation 
question’, because even the modified version is in this respect an 




The feature of the Harm-Based Account that renders it vulnerable 
to the conditions objection and the explanation objection is that it is 
exclusively consequence-focussed. This leaves us with two 
                                                 
28 In the previous section we considered the possibility that all affronts to dignity 
or violations of equal moral worth are harmful. If this were true, Helen’s action 
could be identified as wrong non-contingently, since these harms do not rely on 
any particular outcome obtaining, allowing the defender of the Harm-Based 
Account to avoid the present objection. Although we acknowledge this caveat, 
we reject this expanded conception of harm for the reasons already given.     
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possibilities. Either harm plays no role in a complete account of the 
wrongness of discrimination, or it is one of the factors that 
determine whether discrimination is wrong, why it is wrong, and 
how wrong it is. We favour the second option. A more promising 
account will focus not only on the harmful outcomes of 
discriminatory acts, but also on the deliberation of the 
discriminator and, in particular, on the reasons that motivate, or 
fail to motivate, the discrimination in answering the ‘conditions 
question’, the ‘explanation question’ and the ‘degree question’.  
Though we lack the space to elaborate upon the details of 
this account, it is worth highlighting two of its virtues. First, it is 
capable of accommodating the conclusion that harmless 
discrimination can be wrong. In Cambridge University, Helen 
wrongly takes a feature of a group of applicants as conferring a 
reason to reject their applications, and this is sufficient for the act 
to be wrong. Second, there is a clear rationale for focussing on the 
deliberation of the discriminator. When a discriminator is 
motivated by the wrong reasons or fails to be motivated by the 
rights reasons, she may fail to respect the (equal) moral status of 
the discriminatee.29 
 We emphasise that this is merely a structural outline of an 
alternative theory. The theory must be narrowed down and given 
content by adding more substantive provisions. How is this notion 
of equal moral status to be understood? What are the other factors, 
distinct from the violation of equal moral status, that make 
discrimination wrongful? If discrimination is a distinctive wrong, 
how is the disrespectful treatment involved in discrimination 
distinct from other forms of disrespectful treatment? Moreover, it 
                                                 
29 The moral status of others places constraints on the ways we are permitted to 
treat them, including both how our acts affect them and the reasons for which 
we act. For an argument to this effect in the case of manipulative harm, see 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm, 149-55.    
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must address some of the key criticisms that have been levelled 
against it by defenders of alternative views.30 Though we are not 
pessimistic about the prospects for a theory of discrimination, we 




                                                 
30 For specific objections to Hellman’s and Scanlon’s alternative to the Harm-
Based Account, see Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal, ch. 5.    
